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We all know that labor unions in the private sector are in untrammeled
decline. From about twenty-five percent in the 1950s, today the percent of
employees in the private sector that are members of a labor union is less
than nine percent.' It is expected that the decline will continue until union
density reaches an equilibrium point of about three percent.' The future is
not bright. However, unions in certain industries have been more capable
than in others to stop the disorganization of workers. In Collective
Bargaining in the Private Sector, a number of industrial relations experts
show how the organization of workers has changed in particular industries.
On one end of the spectrum, there are professional team sport players and
airline pilots enjoying high levels of unionization, while, on the other end,
truck drivers and newspaper workers are all but disorganized. The book
helps us understand the issues and challenges facing particular labor unions
in specific industries of the United States.
The editors maintain that the crux of unionization lies in workers'
bargaining power.3 Thus, unionism in the private sector is becoming
extinct because the bargaining power of unions is in steadfast decline.
With no changes in American labor law that would provide more leverage
to workers, such as an end to contestable National Labor Relations Board
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(NLRB) union elections, the demise of unions seems to have no end.4
Indeed, the authors show that the unions that have made inroads in
collective bargaining, such as some hotel unions, telecommunications and
health care workers, have done so by bypassing some of the hurdles
imposed by traditional federal labor laws, including contested union
elections monitored by the NLRB.5
Keeping the contrasting outcomes in unionization trends in United
States industries in mind, one question that Collective Bargaining in the
Private Sector raises, is what has determined, structured or defined
bargaining power across the different sectors? Although the book provides
a thick description of the state of eight industries and their unions, it does
not provide a general theoretical framework to understand bargaining
power. Here, I will suggest a power model based on the work of
sociologist Charles Tilly and his students as a way to "read" and interpret
the thick descriptions in the book. A general theory of union power lets us
understand why the different industries have experienced different trends in
collective bargaining, better comprehend why some unions have made
inroads while others continue to slip down the road of disorganization, and
think about organizational alternatives for the future.
Succinctly stated, the Tilly model of power6 states that power is
obtained through a process of group contention. In that process,
challengers' contentious actions buttress their power, but counter-actions
by the powers that be, in the case of labor relations, capitalists, demobilize
and constrict union power. As such, union power is not only a process
spurred by unions' actions, but also by those of capitalists. As such, the
model suggests cyclical trends in labor union power, where union power
may go through bust and boom periods that depend on its organizational
actions and the responses of capitalists. The power model not only helps us
understand differences across industries, but also through history,
suggesting that the current period of union decline is but one historical
point of the labor movement which may likely change in the future,
provided organized labor continues to challenge, mobilize and act
collectively in the interest of workers.
4. For a detailed account of how American labor laws are imposing undue hurdles on
union organization attempts see Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights
to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983); Paul Weiler, Striking
a Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV .L.
REV. 351 (1984).
5. Clark, supra note 3.
6. See generally, CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION (1978); CHRIS
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I. THE WORST LOSERS AND THE BETTER LOSERS (AND THE ONE WINNER)
IN EIGHT AMERICAN INDUSTRIES
Collective Bargaining in the Private Sector surveys industrial
relations in eight central industries: airlines, automobile, health care,
newspapers, professional sports, telecommunications and trucking.
According to the authors, of the eight industries, all but one, professional
sports, have experienced some kind of decline in the overall power of
unions to negotiate wages and working conditions. Of those unions that
have lost bargaining strength, as perhaps best exemplified by union density
levels, trucking and newspapers have fared the worst. The reasons for the
decline of newspaper unions are attributed to labor saving technologies and
industry consolidation aided by specific tax regulations.7 Industry mergers
and technological changes led to employment declines in specific sectors of
the industry where unions were concentrated, such as production areas,
newsrooms and distribution departments, leading to losses in union
membership levels.8
Union membership in trucking has been curbed by deregulation and
free trade. Increased competition among American trucking companies,
and, since NAFTA, with Mexican trucking companies, has made it
increasingly difficult for trucking unions to keep leverage in the bargaining
table.9
Another industry where unionism continues to erode is in the
automobile industry. The United Auto Workers (UAW) was able to
maintain a high level of bargaining power when it unionized workers in the
entire American auto industry, the "Big Three" car manufacturers, Ford,
General Motors and Chrysler. With such industrial unionism it was able to
exert "pattern bargaining" strategies that effectively took wages out of
competition. 0  In other words, it imposed similar wage and work
conditions on all car manufacturers, making the manufacturers indifferent
as to labor costs, as long as these costs could be passed down to the
consumers. However, with increased outsourcing to small parts
manufacturing in recent decades, relocation to the anti-union, U.S. South
and Third world nations, and the transplant of Japanese and European auto
7. Howard Stranger, Newspapers: Collective Bargaining Decline Amidst
Technological Change, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 179, 184-88.
(Paul F. Clark et. al. eds., 2003).
8. Id. at 189.
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2003).
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manufacturers to the U.S. South, the power of the UAW has been curbed."
In response, the UAW has attempted a number of cooperative agreements
with management, such as the famous Saturn work teams, 2 but even such
concessions have not helped the union stop the bleeding of its bargaining
strength.
Even though unions have lost bargaining power and relative
membership, not all have fared as ill as in newspaper, trucking and auto
unions. Airline pilots have among the highest rates of union membership in
the United States, fifty-nine percent.13  Their high level of union
membership has been maintained in spite of deregulation in the 1970s. The
success of pilots has been attributed to their highly specialized and hard to
replace skills. Pilots can strike and halt airline traffic quite effectively given
that replacement pilots are difficult to find.
14
Another industry where labor unions are making some gains has been
in health care. Physician unions, for example, have are beginning to
surface as a result of the development of HMOs that attempt to unilaterally
establish industry prices and rules to physicians, professionals that, until
then, controlled such decisions in the industry. Like pilots, physicians are
able to effectively combat the power of HMOs because of their monopoly
on very sophisticated and difficult to replace labor power. In fact,
physicians' strongest enemy may be themselves, as many find labor
unionism incongruent with professional norms, even in light of HMOs'
increasing power. It was not until 1999 that the American Medical
Association (AMA) officially sanctioned a collective bargaining body
within its organization, still to the criticism of many of its members. 5
Some health care workers have inevitably gone to the courts to obtain
collective bargaining rights. 16 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
the statute that gives most private sector workers the right to unionize,
excludes supervisory and managerial employees from the right to unionize.
An employer uses such exclusions to try to deny professional workers such
as physicians and nurses the fight to unionize. Recently, in a landmark
decision, the NLRB gave the right to organize to physicians that are solo
practitioners. '7 The NLRB held that given the control of HMOs over solo
practitioners' salaries, working conditions and patient care activities, solo
11. Id. at 57-60.
12. Id. at 78-79.
13. Nancy Brown Johnson, Airlines, Can Collective Bargaining Weather the Storm, in
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 15, 22-23, 36-38 (Paul F. Clark et. al. eds.,
2003).
14. Id. at 22.
15. Paul F. Clark, Health Care: A Growing Role for Collective Bargaining, in
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 91, 105 (Paul F. Clark et. al. eds., 2003).
16. Id. at 106-09.
17. Id. at 109 (citing AmeriHealth HMO v. UFCW Local 56, 326 N.L.R.B. 55 (1999)).
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practitioners were de facto employees of HMOs and, as such, could
organize unions.
Yet, perhaps the most important and interesting inroads made by
health care unions have been attained by other health care professionals,
home care workers. These very low-paid employees have been able to
unionize through innovative political strategies that pressured state
governments to increase Medicaid funding to nursing homes and long-term
care programs. The funds were passed from the state budgets to the
employers. With such funds, the unions were able to obtain wage
concessions from their employers. In return for their lobbying efforts for
Medicaid funds, long-term care unions obtained card checks and neutrality
agreements from their employers. As such, the unions could bypass
traditional NLRB supervised union elections where employers could
challenge the union with lengthy and expensive administrative and legal
procedures. Unionization became simpler for the unions, and inroads were
made. 
18
Other unions that have employed similar political strategies
effectively to obtain neutrality agreements and card checks include those in
the hotel and casino industries. Here, unions lobbied and exerted pressure
on state governments to obtain specific zoning regulations and
appropriations to help build hotels and casinos in the state. In return for
these lobbying efforts, hotel and casino unions obtained neutrality
agreements and card checks.' 9
A third industry that has employed a local or state political strategy to
obtain neutrality agreements and card checks has been the
telecommunications industry unions. Telecommunications unions,
particularly the Communications Workers of America (CWA) have
pressured state governments to facilitate management aims for the re-
consolidation of the industry after the breakup of AT&T and deregulation.
Different from the newspaper and trucking industries, where consolidation
had a negative effect on union membership, communications unions have
at least been able to maintain their hold on wire communication collective
bargaining through their political activities and joint union-management
efforts.2°
Professional team sports are perhaps the most anomalous case of the
eight industries studied in Collective Bargaining in the Private Sector.
18. Clark, supra note 15, at 123-25.
19. C. Jeffrey Waddups & Vincent H. Eade, Hotels and Casinos: Collective Bargaining
During a Decade of Expansion, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 137,
150 (Paul F. Clark et. al. eds., 2003).
20. Jeffrey Keefe & Rosemary Batt, Telecommunications: Collective Bargaining in an
Era of Industry Reconsolidation, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 263,
287, 300-01 (Paul F. Clark et. al. eds., 2003).
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Most unions have not been able to make deep inroads in recent history,
even those that have instituted politically-based strategies. Yet
professional sport unions have made great gains. Professional sport unions,
particularly in baseball, have been able not only to secure collective
bargaining rights to players, but also free agency. This double-barreled
status for players has enabled unions to set a floor for all players while,
concurrently, enabling those that can negotiate better contracts to do so. To
no surprise, the average baseball player salary was over $2.26 million in
2001 .21
Reasons for the effectiveness of baseball unions, as other professional
sports, include that professional sport players have practically irreplaceable
skills. They can bring the game to a halt in the case of a strike in a way
that other workers cannot. How can one replace the Sammy Sosas of the
world?
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the professional sports
industry is subsidized to the point that it is hard to describe it as a truly
competitive industry. Stadiums, for example, are now built with public
funds. Cities vie for professional baseball teams by building better
22facilities to house them. These subsidies make wage concessions easier
for the teams. Moreover, multi-billionaires now increasingly own many
professional sports teams. These magnates have as a goal to build a
championship team, even at a loss, in order to win the prestige and acclaim
of owning such a team. Making money is, therefore, less of a motivation
for building teams and retaining players. As Dworkin and Posthuma state,
"Just as big-game hunter spends big bucks to bag an exotic animal, today's
team owners want winning teams, even if it means sometimes operating at
a net loss. ' ' 23 Professional sports teams have been practically taken out of
the profit system. As such, the professional sports industry, different from
other industries, contains a different, non-profit economic logic that enables
players to obtain salaries much larger than those of workers in other
industries where profitability matters.
II. TYING IT ALL TOGETHER WITH A POWER MODEL OF UNIONIZATION
We can generalize from the eight cases by using Tilly's model of
24
power. Charles Tilly developed a model of collective action that has
been generally applied to labor mobilization and other forms of collective
21. James B. Dworkin & Richard A. Posthuma, Professional Sports: Collective
Bargaining in the Spotlight, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 217, 233
(Paul F. Clark et. al. eds., 2003).
22. Id., at 227-29.
23. Id., at 222-23.
24. See CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION (1978).
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action.25 As Tilly's model suggests, power, in our case measured as the
percentage of workers in a labor union, or union density, is acquired by
workers from their organization, mobilization, and collective actions.
Organization refers to "the structure of the group, and in particular those
aspects that affect its capacity for collective action. 26 The organization of
work is perhaps the most important organizational condition that impacts
the possibilities that workers have to stop production and exert power
21against capital. Mobilization refers to the process by which the union
acquires control over the resources needed for collective action. In the
American labor union scene, for example, most resources that are attained
by unions are labor power, or the workers' capacity to work, and union
dues. Collective actions refer the particular types of concerted activities
that unions undertake. These may include direct actions such as strikes or
pickets, or representative actions, such as legal suits, arbitration
proceedings and lobbying.
Tilly's power model also suggests that the ability of incumbents to
counter-mobilize, or repress the challenger, affects the challenger's power.
Counter-mobilization includes changes in the organization of work in the
industry, replacement of workers with machines or repressive actions that
try to thwart union activities, such as injunctions or police repression. 2' As
Tilly's model shows, counter-mobilization can impact the challenger at the
organizational level, its mobilization of group resources, and the collective
actions that it undertakes.
III. APPLYING THE MODEL
Collective Bargaining in the Private Sector, gives us rich information
regarding the organization of work in eight industries. We see that that the
organization of work aided or hindered particular workers from mobilizing
group resources, mostly in the form of labor power, and performing
collective actions, such as strikes. Negative responses from employers to
these actions have repelled workers from making further inroads in
collective bargaining and demobilized many.
Let us start analyzing those unions that have lost the most union
membership. These were trucking and newspapers, with auto workers
trailing not too far behind. Trucking workers were able to exert pressure
on employers when the industry was national in scope. Specific
25. See ROBERTO FRANZOSI, THE PUZZLE OF STRIKES: CLASS AND STATE STRATEGIES IN
POSTWAR ITALY 350 (1995); see also JOHN KELLY, RETHINKING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS:
MOBILIZATION, COLLECTIVISM AND LONG WAVES (1998).
26. KELLY, supra note 25, at 24-25.
27. CHRIS TILLY & CHARLES TILLY, WORK UNDER CAPITALISM 242-49 (1998).
28. KELLY, supra note 25, at 24-25.
2003]
662 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 5:3
regulations established rules of how trucking companies were hired, and
how many trucking companies a customer could hire.29 Competition
ensued when the industry was deregulated and the market's logic was
placed on the industry. Increased competition led to wage pressures, and
with Mexican trucking companies joining in after NAFTA, the capacity of
workers to pressure employers for concessions waned. In other words,
even if truck drivers struck, the market pressures made it impossible for the
industry to provide wage concessions to them. The reorganization of the
industry as a competitive venture made workers' capacity to mobilize labor
power ineffective, and their union membership began to corrode.
Similar events occurred in the newspaper industry. Technological
changes and industry mergers have led to layoffs and the replacement of
workers with machines. The power of unions to remain large and effective
thus waned as a result of organizational changes brought by industry heads.
Counter-mobilization strategies at the point of organization effectively
reduced the power of newspaper unions.
In the automobile industry, the situation has been similar. Industry
decisions to outsource production of auto parts to small producers, setting
up shop in the southern United States and the Third World, and the
transplant of Japanese and European manufacturers to the southern United
States led to the relative loss of union membership in the U.S. auto
industry. Prior to such actions, the organization of work in the Big Three
companies made it possible for unions to create industrial unions that set
standard wages and working conditions across the industry, taking wages
out of competition. Counter-mobilization strategies at the organization
level, again, led to the demise of unions.
However, some unions have not lost members to the extent that
newspaper, trucking and auto industries have lost union members, even
though their industries experienced deregulation and increased market
pressures. These include the telecommunications industry and airlines
industry. The reason why airline pilots did not suffer the same fate as
truckers, auto workers and newspapers is that even with the counter-
mobilization strategy of deregulation, they remained hard to replace. Their
skill levels remain too complex to be easily found in replacements. The
organization of work in the airline industry, therefore, still depends on
highly trained pilots, even under deregulation. This has kept pilot unions
strong.
Yet, telecommunication workers do not have such hard-to-replace
skills. What enabled their unions to maintain a slower pace of
disorganization than truckers and newspaper workers when their industry
deregulated and when they had replaceable skills? Here it seems that
29. Belzer, supra note 9, at 311.
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telecommunication unions maintained higher relative power given the type
of collective actions that they undertook as a response to deregulation.
Different from newspaper unions and trucking unions that kept the strike as
the most crucial collective action aimed at forcing management to provide
concessions, telecommunications unions took political strategies to tackle
changes in the organization of work in the industry. The CWA entered into
"strategic partnerships" with management, where the union obtained card
checks and neutrality agreements from management when the union
lobbied at the state level to obtain regulatory changes to help the industry.3°
CWA had mixed results with the strategy, but at least did not experience
the disorganization levels that newspapers and trucking unions
experienced. Union density levels in the telecommunications industry were
twenty-eight percent in 1998, much higher than the national average of
about thirteen percent in that year.
Similarly, unions in the healthcare industry and the casino and hotel
industries obtained card check and neutrality agreements as a result of their
local political actions. Political actions aided unions in bypassing the
traditional NLRB elections process, where employers can stall the union
building process through administrative and legal obstacles. The type of
collective action unions take, therefore, has a strong impact on their
capacity to amass power even in light of counter-mobilization strategies
that erode their economic bargaining power.
Finally, in addition to airline pilots, who seem to have maintained
relatively high collective bargaining power, professional sport players have
kept bargaining strength. In fact, they have obtained more bargaining
rights and wage concessions than ever before. In the case of baseball
players, the power model suggests that, first, the changes in the industry,
including public subsidies to stadiums and the industry's ability to operate
at a loss helps the industry provide more concessions to players. No other
industry detailed in Collective Bargaining in the Private Sector underwent
such a radical elimination of the profit motive as professional sports. With
the profit motive curbed, players' bargaining power increased. Moreover,
the ability of players to stop the industry through their irreplaceable skills
has made them a powerful force to reckon with. The mixture of an industry
driven by something other than profits and irreplaceable skills has made
professional sport players uniquely powerful union members.
IV. CONCLUSION: POLITICS FOR UNION POWER FOR THE PRESENT AND THE
FUTURE
Not all workers can be professional baseball players or airline pilots.
30. Keefe & Batt, supra note 20, at 287.
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This does not mean, however, that they have to see their unions completely
disappear. Some workers, such as telecommunications workers, hotel and
casino workers and long-term, home care workers have been able to make
some inroads in collective bargaining by easing their way out of NLRB
contested elections through local, political collective actions. This is
perhaps the most important lesson that we learn through a comparative
Tillyan power analysis of the experience of unions detailed in Collective
Bargaining in the Private Sector. Negative counter-mobilization forces in
the form of industrial organizational change has been confronted by some
audacious union leaders with new political strategies that have given them
an edge to organize in hard times.
Studying the book helps us learn from the successes and failures of
others to build strategies for the future. At this day in age, bypassing old
organizational strategies seems imperative. In fact, it has helped the unions
that have tried. Further use of political opportunities may provide ways to
make inroads in today's anti-union environment. Hopefully, those
opportunities will be taken with the hope that, at some point, a new national
convergence can occur to change national labor laws in ways that they
become more relevant to United States workers.
